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I. INTRODUCTION
Reacting to the tremendous damage which has been done to
property and individuals by drunken drivers, concerned citizens
have begun to organize for the purpose of increasing public aware-
ness of the hazards of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and to
lobby for tougher penalties and stricter enforcement of DWI and
implied consent statutes.' As a result, twenty-seven state legisla-
1. Two of the more prominent groups in this movement are MADD (Mothers
Against Drunk Drivers), which has grown to eighty-three chapters in twenty-
nine states in just two years, and RID (Remove Intoxicated Drivers-U.S.A.),
which has fifty-nine chapters in twenty-nine states.
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tures passed more stringent DWI laws in 1982.2 Among the states
which responded to the cries for new legislation was Nebraska,
which, in 1982, enacted its current DWI and implied consent
statutes. 3
As is the case with all DWI legislation, the aim of Nebraska's
DWI statute is to deter individuals from operating motor vehicles
while under the influence of alcohol or other drugs and, thereby,
promote highway safety. The Nebraska statute accomplishes this
goal by providing a minimum penalty of probation, sixty day li-
cense revocation for first time offenders and a maximum penalty of
permanent license revocation for third time offenders, as well as
by abolishing pretrial diversion.4
To ensure the effective enforcement of the DWI statutes, almost
all states have enacted implied consent statutes, which provide
that each driver within the state, by the exercise of the privilege of
driving within the state, is deemed to have consented to chemical
testing for the purpose of determining the driver's degree of intoxi-
cation.5 Under the implied consent statutes, if a driver refuses to
2. See The War Against Drunk Drivers, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 1982, at 34. For ex-
amples of the more stringent penalties accompanying a DWI conviction, see
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 316.193, 316.1931 (West Supp. 1983) (providing for maxi-
mum penalties of six months imprisonment, nine months imprisonment, and
one year imprisonment, respectively, for the first, second, and third offenses);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312-B (2) (Supp. 1982-1983) (providing for
mandatory minimum fines of $350, incarceration of not less than forty-eight
hours, and suspension of the operator's license for ninety days); MD. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. §§ 21-902, 27-101(21) (Supp. 1982) (imposing a possible fine of $500
and imprisonment of two months).
3. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.07 (Cum. Supp. 1982) (DWI statute); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 39-669.08 (Cum. Supp. 1982) (implied consent statute).
4. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.07 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
5. ALA. CODE § 32-5-192 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031 (Supp. 1982); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANm. § 28-691 (Supp. 1982-1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1045 (1979); CAL.
VEH. CODE § 13353 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1202 (Supp.
1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227b (West Supp. 1982); DEL CODE ANN. tit.
21, § 2740 (Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 40-1002 (West Supp. 1978-1979);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.261 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 68B-306 (Supp.
1982); HAwAI REV. STAT. § 286-151 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 49-352 (Supp.
1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 , § 11-501.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); IND.
CODE ANN. § 9-4-4.5-1 (Burns 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321B.4 (West Supp.
1983-1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001 (1982); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186.565
(Baldwin 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:661 (West Supp. 1983); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312 (1978 & Supp. 1982-1983); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-
205.1 (Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(f) (West Supp. 1983-
1984); MICH. Coim. LAws ANN. § 257.625c (Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT.
§ 169.123 (1980); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-11-5 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 577.020 (Vernon Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402 (1981); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 39-669.08 (Cum. Supp. 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.383 (1981); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 265:84 (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2 (West Supp. 1983-
1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-107 (Supp. 1982); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194
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submit to chemical testing after being placed in custody, an admin-
istrative hearing is held to provide the defendant an opportunity to
show good cause for such refusal; if good cause cannot be shown,
the driver's license may be revoked for a period of time.6 Unlike
other states, the Nebraska implied consent statute provides that
refusal to submit to chemical testing not only results in an admin-
istrative license revocation, but is also deemed to be a criminal of-
fense which is punishable in the same degree as if the person had
actually been convicted of DWI.7
Since implied consent statutes essentially force the defendant
to release information about himself which could be used against
him in a subsequent criminal trial, and since this evidence is gath-
ered in what seems to be a criminal prosecution against the de-
fendant, the question is raised as to whether the defendant has a
constitutionally guaranteed right under either the fifth or sixth
amendment to consult with counsel before being forced to submit
to chemical testing.8 State courts which have considered this
question have focused on the fact that such chemical testing is
done pursuant to the implied consent statute which is considered
to be civil, not criminal in nature. Based on this determination,
these state courts have found that the accused has no constitution-
ally guaranteed right to counsel, since the fifth and sixth amend-
ments afford such a right only in the case of criminal proceedings. 9
(McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (Cum. Supp. 1981);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (1980); Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1 (Page
Supp. 1982); ONLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 751 (West Supp. 1982-1983); OR. REV.
STAT. § 487.805 (1981); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1547 (Purdon Supp. 1983-
1984); RI. GEN. LAWs § 31-27-2.1 (Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2950
(Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 32-23-10 (Supp. 1982); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 55-10-406 (Supp. 1982); TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701L-5
(Vernon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 1202 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 18.2-268 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 46.20.308 (Supp. 1983-1984); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-1 (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT.
§ 343.305 (1979-1980).
6. Statutes vary as to the period of revocation and other penalties which may
result from refusal to submit to chemical analysis under the implied consent
statutes. While no driver under any state statute can be forced to take the
chemical test against his will, some states provide a statutory right to refuse
testing; however, even in those states which grant a right to refuse testing,
the consequence of such refusal is still the revocation of the driver's license.
See Note, Driving While Intoxicated and the Right to Counsel: The Case
Against Implied Consent, 58 TEx. L. REV. 935 (1980).
7. NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
8. See infra section II. The fifth amendment has been interpreted to apply
when the suspect is in custody and is involved in any type of custodial inter-
rogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The sixth amendment
gives the accused a right to have counsel present at any critical stage of a
criminal proceeding. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Winter v. Peterson, 208 Neb. 785, 305 N.W.2d 803 (1981); Seders v.
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
The Nebraska Supreme Court has similarly held that a driver
who is arrested for DWI has no constitutional right to consult an
attorney before being required to submit to chemical testing.O
The Nebraska court has also held that the request to consult an
attorney constitutes a qualified refusal to submit to chemical test-
ing," and that the qualified or conditional refusal invokes the sanc-
tions specified in the state's implied consent statute. 12 Since
Nebraska's implied consent statute provides not only for adminis-
trative sanctions but also criminal sanctions, the determination
that the accused has no right to counsel at the time he is requested
to submit to chemical analysis is especially disturbing.
This Article analyzes the scope of the right to counsel afforded
under the fifth and sixth amendments and the policy reasons for
granting such a right in particular cases. Next, these tests and pol-
icies will be applied to the accused's decision to submit to chemi-
cal analysis to determine whether such a right exists, or should
exist. Finally, some of the administrative problems with affording
such a right to counsel will be addressed.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE RIGHT
TO COUNSEL
A. The Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel
The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides: "No person
shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... 13 In Miranda v. Arizona,14 the leading interpretive
decision on the fifth amendment right to counsel, the Supreme
Court was primarily concerned with the various physical and
mental compulsion techniques which were occasionally used in
police interrogations to force the suspect to incriminate himself. 5
In an effort to provide safeguards against such forced incrimina-
tions, the Court established a list of warnings which must be read
to suspects who are in custody and about to be interrogated.16 One
Powell, 298 N.C. 453, 259 S.E.2d 544 (1979); State v. Braunesreither, 276 N.W.2d
139 (S.D. 1979); Brewer v. State Dep't of Motor Veh., 23 Wash. App. 412, 595
P.2d 949 (1979). But see Heles v. State, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D.), vacated as
moot in 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982) (the issue was mooted by the defendant's
death prior to decision).
10. See, e.g., Winter v. Peterson, 208 Neb. 785, 305 N.W.2d 803 (1981); Wiseman v.
Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724, 211 N.W.2d 906 (1973); Stevenson v. Sullivan, 190 Neb.
295, 207 N.W.2d 680 (1973); State v. Oleson, 180 Neb. 546, 143 N.W.2d 917 (1966).
11. Sedlacek v. Peterson, 204 Neb. 625, 284 N.W.2d 556 (1979).
12. Winter v. Peterson, 208 Neb. 785, 305 N.W.2d 803 (1981).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15. Id. at 469.
16. The Miranda warnings state: that the suspect has the right to remain silent;
[Vol. 63:373
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of the primary safeguards alluded to by the Court was the right of
the accused to consult with an attorney and to have that attorney
present during his interrogation to provide reassurance to the ac-
cused that he need not provide incriminating information. By
comparison, the scope of the protection, in terms of the right to an
attorney, is much more limited under the fifth amendment than it
is under the sixth.
B. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall ... have the assistance of counsel for his de-
fense.' 7 As explained in Powell v. Alabama,18 the purpose of the
sixth amendment right to counsel is to protect the rights of lay-
men, who are assumed to be unfamiliar with the intricacies of legal
proceedings, by providing them the assistance of counsel.' 9 In de-
termining the stage of the criminal prosecution where effective
assistance of counsel is constitutionally mandated, the court looks
to the detriment which the defendant would sustain if forced to
undergo a particular stage of the proceeding without counsel; this
process of determination has been labeled the critical stage
analysis.20
Use of the critical stage analysis has enabled the Supreme
Court to extend the applicability of the sixth amendment right to
counsel beyond the confines of the trial itself, to various pretrial
confrontations.2 ' The Court has identified two factors which must
that anything he says can and will be used against him in court; that he has a
right to consult with an attorney; and, that if he cannot afford an attorney, one
will be provided for him. Id. at 479.
17. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
18. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
19. Specifically, the Powell Court stated:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good
or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowl-
edge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have [sic] a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to es-
tablish his innocence.
Id.
20. For a discussion of the critical stage analysis, see United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967). See also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 37 (1973).
21. Originally, the sixth amendment right to counsel was interpreted to apply
only to the trial of the accused. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
However, as pretrial confrontations between the accused and officials of the
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be considered when determining whether a particular type of con-
frontation between the suspect and the police constitutes a "criti-
cal stage": (1) whether consultation with an attorney is
"necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as
affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witness
against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial
itself,"22 and (2) whether the pretrial confrontation could result in
"potential substantial prejudice" to the defendant's rights and
whether the presence of counsel would help avoid such
prejudice. 23 If the court finds that a particular type of proceeding
or confrontation constitutes a critical stage, the accused must be
afforded the right to have an attorney present at the event.
M. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN A DWI PROCEEDING
Having analyzed the scope of the right to counsel under both
the fifth and sixth amendments, it should be obvious that each
amendment: (1) seeks to protect different and distinct rights of
the accused, (2) is supported by a different set of rationale, and
(3) employs different sets of tests to define its parameters.24 Yet
the right to counsel under both amendments is strictly limited to
criminal proceedings. 25 Therefore, before conducting an independ-
ent analysis of the right to counsel in DWI proceedings under each
of the amendments, it is useful to determine whether the common
threshold requirement-that the proceeding must be criminal in
nature-can be met with regard to a driver's submission to chermi-
cal testing.
state became more common, the Supreme Court recognized that
"'[a] ssistance' would be less than meaningful if it were limited to the formal
trial itself." United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973). Indeed, the
Supreme Court has found that the accused has a right to have counsel pres-
ent at during various nontrial proceedings. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S.
220 (1977) (identification of the defendant at a preliminary hearing-a critical
stage); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearing-a critical
stage); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (sentencing-a critical stage);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (pretrial line-up--a critical stage);
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (arraignment-a critical stage). But
see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (presentation of a photographic
display-not a critical stage); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (suspect's
right to counsel attaches only after the state commits itself to prosecute the
accused); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (the taking of defendant's
handwriting exemplar-not a critical stage).
22. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
23. Id.
24. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
25. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 37
(1963).
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A. Criminal Proceedings Threshold
A majority of the courts draw a distinction between the crimi-
nal nature of the DWI proceeding and the apparently civil nature
of the implied consent proceeding.26 Pointing to the administra-
tive proceeding and penalty of license revocation for failure to sub-
mit to chemical testing under the implied consent statute, the
courts have found that the proceedings under this statute are civil,
not criminal, in nature, and, thus, no fifth or sixth amendment right
to counsel is afforded at the time of the request to submit to chemi-
cal analysis.27
In addition to being circular, the above reasoning can be at-
tacked on the ground that the fine line which has been drawn be-
tween the criminal DWI proceeding and the "civil" implied
consent statute has no basis in reality.28 The arrest, which is made
prior to the request for submission to chemical analysis, places the
suspect in custody for a criminal offense, and the testing is con-
ducted for the sole purpose of gathering evidence to convict him of
a crime. Since it is the refusal to submit which invokes the implied
consent statute and its administrative penalties, it would be unrea-
sonable to conclude that the proceeding is anything but a criminal
proceeding until such refusal is made. Thus, if the proceeding is
criminal prior to the accused's response, then (provided the other
requirements of the fifth and sixth amendments can be met) the
accused should be afforded the right to consult counsel before that
response is required to be made. In any event, it is pure fiction to
assume that the DWI proceeding loses its criminal nature simply
because administrative penalties are imposed upon the accused's
failure to comply with the procedures for gathering evidence to
convict him of a crime. In Nebraska, this fiction between criminal
and civil proceedings is even more difficult to sustain, since the
Nebraska implied consent statute imposes criminal sanctions
upon the refusal to submit to testing.2 9
It must be concluded that the artificial and unrealistic classifi-
cation of the implied consent proceedings as being civil in nature
should no longer be maintained as an impediment to the exercise
26. See supra note 21.
27. For cases which have followed this reasoning, see, e.g., Seders v. Powell, 298
N.C. 453, 259 S.E.2d 544 (1979); Brewer v. State Dep't of Motor Veh., 23 Wash.
App. 412,595 P.2d 949 (1979). Some state courts, however, have found that the
accused has a right to consult with an attorney before submitting to chemical
testing based on state statute. See, e.g., Gooch v. Spardling, 523 S.W.2d 861
(Mo. Ct. App. 1975). For examples of statutes which confer such a right of
refusal, see CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227b (West Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIF[ED
LAws ANN. § 32-23-10 (Supp. 1982).
28. See Heles v. State, 530 F. Supp. 646, 651 (D.S.D. 1982).
29. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
19841
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of an individual's constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel. As-
suming that the courts adopt the above reasoning and that the
threshold requirement-i.e., the proceeding must be criminal in
nature-is met, the question now is whether the fifth and sixth
amendments afford a right to counsel prior to the accused's sub-
mission to chemical testing.
B. The Fifth Amendment Right
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was
interpreted in Miranda 30 as requiring a right to counsel for crimi-
nal suspects only when the suspect is in custody and about to be
subjected to interrogation.3 ' Since DWI is a criminal offense (mak-
ing the individual being held for the violation a criminal suspect),
and since almost all DWI statutes require the accused to be in cus-
tody before he is required to submit to the chemical testing,32 the
question left unresolved is whether the required submission to
chemical testing can be considered to be an interrogation within
the meaning of the fifth amendment. The Supreme Court, in
Schmerber v. California,3 3 disposed of this issue, holding that ad-
mission of the results of a blood test sample, forcibly extracted
from a driver without his consent, did not violate his privilege
against self-incrimination.34 The Court emphasized that "the privi-
lege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify
against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature."3 5 Finding that there was no
testimonial compulsion in being required to submit to blood tests,
the Schmerber Court explained the distinction as being that "the
privilege is a bar against compelling 'communications' or 'testi-
30. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
31. The Heles court noted that the Miranda warnings were read to Heles, but the
court expressed concern that such a reading could mislead the accused into
believing that he had a right to consult an attorney before submitting to the
chemical analysis. Other courts have expressed similar concerns and have
gone so far as to reverse the administrative license revocation where a read-
ing of the Miranda warnings (prior to conducting the chemical analysis) was
shown to have misled the accused and was a factor in the accused's decision
to refuse submission. See, e.g., Rees v. Dep't of Motor Veh., 8 Cal. App. 3d 746,
87 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1970); Calvert v. State Dep't of Rev., Motor Veh. Div., 184
Colo. 214, 519 P.2d 341 (1974); State v. Severino, 56 Hawaii 378, 537 P.2d 1187
(1975); Swan v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 311 So. 2d 498 (La. App. 1975); Wiseman
v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724, 211 N.W.2d 906 (1973).
32. See, e.g., State v. Brunner, 211 Kan. 596, 507 P.2d 233 (1973); Prigge v. Johns,
184 Neb. 103, 165 N.W.2d 556 (1969), affirmed on appeal from remand 186 Neb.
761, 186 N.W.2d 497 (1971); State v. Weatherell, 82 Wash. 2d 865, 514 P.2d 1069
(1973).
33. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
34. See id. at 761.
35. Id.
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mony' but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the
source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate it."36
Applied in the DWI setting under the implied consent statutes,
many courts have used the reasoning of Schmerber to hold that the
denial of an opportunity to consult an attorney before submitting
to chemical testing does not violate the accused's privilege against
self-incrimination. 37 It would seem, therefore, that the fifth
amendment right to counsel would not apply to such DWI proceed-
ings under the implied consent statutes. Thus, if such a right is to
exist, it must be found within the scope of the sixth amendment.
C. The Sixth Amendment Right
As discussed previously, the sixth amendment right to counsel
comes into existence only after a criminal prosecution has been
initiated, and will attach only to those criminal proceedings which
constitute "critical stages" of the criminal action against the ac-
cused.38 Whether a criminal prosecution is deemed to begin at the
time the defendent is required to submit to chemical testing will
depend, to a great extent, on whether the court labels the submis-
sion to such testing as a "critical stage" of a prosecution. Thus, the
latter issue will be discussed first.
36. Id. at 764. Recently, in South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S.Ct. 916 (1983), the
Supreme Court held that the admission of the driver's refusal to submit to
testing does not violate his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
37. See, e.g., Clay v. Riddle, 541 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1976); Warren v. State, 385 A.2d
1376 (Del. 1978); State v. Oleson, 180 Neb. 546, 143 N.W.2d 917 (1966); State v.
Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970). But see Prideaux v. State Dep't of Pub.
Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1976).
The Nebraska Supreme Court has strictly adhered to the Schmerber ra-
tional in denying a fifth amendment right to counsel in DWI cases. In State v.
Oleson, 180 Neb. 546, 143 N.W.2d 917 (1966), the court held that a driver's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to the chemical
testing required by the implied consent statute:
A blood or urine test is not a comparable class with confessions or
incriminating statements .... The giving of the sample pursuant to
the statute does not involve a question of... self-incrimination. ...
The privilege against self-incrimination is limited to the giving of oral
testimony and does not extend to defendant's body, nor to secretions
therefrom, nor to the introduction of the chemical analysis in
evidence.
Id. at 550, 143 N.W.2d at 919-20. In a later decision, the Nebraska court held
that the Miranda warnings, providing a right to counsel, applied only to cus-
todial interrogations and had no application to a proper request for submis-
sion to testing under the implied consent statute. Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190
Neb. 725, 211 N.W.2d 906 (1973).
38. See supra section II(B) of text.
1984]
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1. Submission to Chemical Analysis as a Critical Stage
Although most courts have dismissed the sixth amendment
right to counsel argument (i.e., that the sixth amendment provides
the accused a right to counsel before he is required to submit to
chemical testing in a DWI proceeding), on the grounds that chemi-
cal tests involve little likelihood of inaccuracy or susceptibility to
manipulation, and that the presence of an attorney is not essential
to ensure that the defendant's right to a fair trial is protected,39
such reasoning employs an extremely narrow view of what consti-
tutes a critical stage of the prosecution. The Supreme Court has
defined "critical stage" broadly to include "those pretrial proce-
dures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is
required to proceed without counsel."40 If, as the Supreme Court
suggests, the results of the proceedings and the impact of those
results on the accused are taken into consideration in determining
whether the decision to submit to chemical testing should be
deemed to be "critical," it would be difficult to imagine how such
proceedings could not qualify as a critical stage.
First, the results of the tests are admissible as evidence in court
and may be used to establish a prima facie case against the ac-
cused.41 The fact that the accused refused to take the test may be
used as evidence against him, as well.42 Clearly, the decision of
whether or not to submit to chemical testing will have a great bear-
ing on the type of evidence which will be presented against the
accused at trial.
In addition, the decision of whether to submit to testing will
have a large impact on the type and the amount of liability to
which the defendant will be subjected. A simple refusal to submit
to testing will probably mean the potential revocation of the ac-
cused's license (triggering the attendant hardships which might
result from the loss of such driving privileges).43 However, if the
accused submits to the test and fails, he not only incurs an in-
creased possibility of being convicted of the DWI crime, but he
may also, depending on the circumstances and facts surrounding
his arrest, leave himself open to other civil and criminal penal-
39. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (dictum); Campbell v.
Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971).
40. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975).
41. See State v. Dush, 214 Neb. 51, 332 N.W.2d 678 (1983); State v. Gerber, 206 Neb.
75, 291 N.W.2d 403 (1980).
42. See South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S.Ct. 916 (1983).
43. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (Because an operator's license has
become essential to the pursuit of livelihood in today's society, the Court in-
dicated that the possession of the license is a property right which may not
be taken away without due process of law.).
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ties.44 Thus, even though the driver's refusal to submit to the
chemical analysis may result in license revocation and other sanc-
tions under the implied consent statute, one can certainly imagine
situations where refusal might be to the driver's advantage.45
As indicated, the consequences resulting from the accused's de-
cision to submit, or not submit, to chemical analysis are both com-
plex and far-reaching.46 The assistance of a knowledgeable
attorney is crucial at this point, not only because of the variety and
magnitude of the consequences resulting from the decision to sub-
mit, but also because the decision itself is irreversible and, there-
fore, has the effect of foreclosing various options which might
otherwise be available to the accused in subsequent proceedings.47
The Supreme Court has ruled that two of the primary factors to be
considered when determining whether a particular confrontation
constitutes a critical stage of the proceeding against the accused
are whether the confrontation would result in "potential substan-
tial prejudice" to the defendant's rights, and whether the presence
of counsel would be advantageous in preventing such prejudice.48
Since the driver who is arrested for DWI may be disoriented, be-
wildered, and frightened by the confrontation (and is probably un-
44. Numerous courts have held that evidence of intoxication obtained from
chemical testing may be used to support the requisite disregard for human
life in a prosecution for motor vehicle homicide. See, e.g., Clayton v. State,
359 So. 2d 419 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978); Lupro v. State, 603 P.2d 468 (Alaska
1979); Gooch v. State, 155 Ga. App. 708, 272 S.E.2d 572 (1980); State v. Som-
mers, 201 Neb. 809, 272 N.W.2d 367 (1978). Evidence of intoxication may also
be used in subsequent criminal prosecutions, see, e.g., State v. Coates, 17
.Wash. App. 415, 563 P.2d 208 (1977) (for criminal negligence); Royle v. State,
151 Ga. App. 85, 258 S.E.2d 921 (1979) (for reckless driving); Kirkendall v.
State, 265 Ark. 853, 581 S.W.2d 341 (1979) (for failure to stop and render aid);
State v. Corpuz, 49 Or. App. 811, 621 P.2d 604 (1980) (for assault). Moreover,
the conviction for DWI has been held to be admissible as evidence in subse-
quent civil action arising out of the same facts. See, e.g., Scott v. Robertson,
583 P.2d 188 (Alaska 1978).
45. For example, if the driver had been involved in an alcohol related accident
which resulted in a death, the driver might well consider refusing to submit
to testing. The Nebraska Supreme Court held in State v. Sommer, 201 Neb.
809, 272 N.W.2d 637 (1978), that the results of chemical testing under the im-
plied consent statute are admissible against the driver in a later trial for auto-
mobile manslaughter. Thus, the driver would be faced with a choice between
risking criminal DWI penalties for refusal to submit to chemical testing, or an
increased possibility of conviction for automobile manslaughter.
46. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
47. As the court stated in Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D. 1982):
"The arrested person must make a critical and binding decision, which will
affect him or her in subsequent legal proceedings .... A decision under
these circumstances is just as critical and equally as binding as the decision
to make a statement following an arrest." Id. at 652.
48. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). See also supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
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aware of all the possible ramifications of the decision to submit to
chemical analysis), the courts should conclude that counsel's
assistance in weighing the various factors and alternatives, and in
preserving the defendant's options in the later proceeding, would
indeed help the accused make an informed, rational decision and
thus prevent "substantial potential prejudice" to his rights. There-
fore, a request for submission to chemical analysis should be
deemed a critical stage of the criminal DWI proceeding, and the
accused should be entitled, under the sixth amendment, to consult
with an attorney before making the decision to submit.
2. Submission to Chemical Analysis as a Stage of Criminal
Prosecution
In Kirby v. Illinois49 the Supreme Court held that the sixth
amendment right to counsel may attach to pretrial confrontations
or proceedings, but only after the state commits itself to the prose-
cution of the accused. Thus, the only remaining stumbling block to
the recognition of a sixth amendment right to counsel before sub-
mission to testing is whether the state, at the time of the request
for submission, has committed itself to the prosecution of the
accused.
The Court in Kirby found that the state commits itself to a
criminal prosecution "at the initiation of [the] judicial proceed-
ing," at which point the suspect is "faced with the prosecutorial
forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of sub-
stantive and procedural criminal law."50 The Court emphasized
that this point "marks the commencement of a 'criminal prosecu-
tion' to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amend-
ment are applicable."5 1
Although most state courts considering the issue have held that
criminal prosecution begins after the accused's decision to take
the test, reasoning that a judicial criminal proceeding is not initi-
ated until the government commits itself to the prosecution of the
accused, and that this commitment is not made until after the
chemical tests are taken, a contrary result is indicated by the
Supreme Court.52 The Supreme Court has consistently employed
the critical stage analysis to determine at what point a sixth
amendment right to counsel attaches.53 As analyzed above, the de-
cision of whether or not to submit to chemical analysis should, in
fact, be found to be a critical stage of the proceedings against the
49. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
50. Id. at 689.
51. Id. at 689-90.
52. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1982). See supra note 19.
53. See cases cited supra note 21.
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accused. Furthermore, it would seem apparent that the driver, at
that point, is certainly "faced with the prosecutorial forces of or-
ganized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and
procedural criminal law."5 4 Therefore, considering the nature of
the sixth amendment right to counsel and the protections it guar-
antees, the better interpretation is that the criminal prosecution
against the accused in a DWI proceeding begins at the time he is
asked to submit to the chemical analysis, and that the accused
must be afforded the opportunity to consult with an attorney
before responding to that request.
D. Administrative Concerns
Affording the accused a right to counsel before forcing him to
respond to a request for his submission to chemical testing does
indeed raise some concern as to the practicality of the administra-
tion of such a right. These concerns are now addressed to deter-
mine their validity.
One of the primary, and most obvious, concerns with granting a
right to counsel in DWI cases is that the level of alcohol in the
bloodstream diminishes markedly between the time of the arrest
and the time it takes for the attorney to be contacted and come to
the accused's assistance. This time difference reduces the reliabil-
ity of the tests as indicators of the amount of alcohol content in the
accused's body during the operation of the vehicle. While it is true
that some dissipation of the alcohol in the bloodstream will occur
during the delay, by statutorily limiting the amount of time which
the accused has to secure the presence of his attorney, the danger
of significant alterations in the alcohol content of the accused dur-
ing the lapse of time can be avoided. Alternatively, the courts
could interpret the sixth amendment right to counsel as being a
limited right of the accused to secure the presence of an attorney
within a "reasonable time," thus preserving the ability of the
courts to take into consideration the individual facts and circum-
stances of the case. In any event, some time limitation on the right
to counsel would seem to be warranted.
A second concern deals with the administrative problems
which would arise when the accused does not know an attorney
who would be willing to represent him in the DWI matter, or when
an attorney who agrees to represent the accused cannot personally
be available for the accused within the time limits imposed. The
Washington court in State v. Fitzsimmon5 5 addressed the problem
alluded to in the first situation, suggesting that if the accused does
54. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
55. 93 Wash. 2d 436, 610 P.2d 893 (1980).
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not know an attorney who would represent him, the police officer
could very easily supply the defendant with a list of criminal de-
fense attorneys (including the public defender) and their phone
numbers. As for the second situation, where the accused's attor-
ney cannot immediately come to his assistance, the court in Fitz-
simmon suggested that, due to the nature of the offense and the
need for prompt assistance, the right to consult with an attorney
could be satisfied through a phone conversation, rather than hav-
ing the attorney appear in person. As stated by the Fitzsimmon
court: "The unique nature of the offense of driving while under the
influence and the circumstances under which the defendant is
likely to be arrested and charged both create the constitutional
right and limit the type of effort the state must make to avoid vio-
lating that right."56 Thus, it would seem that neither of these situa-
tions would cause the administrative havoc predicted.
A final concern is the issue of whether counsel must be pro-
vided by the state to indigent suspects. In Argersinger v. Ham-
lin,57 the Supreme Court held that "no person could be
imprisoned, regardless of the degree of seriousness of a crime, un-
less counsel has been either been appointed or properly waived."5 8
However, in a later decision, Scott v. Illinois,59 the Court held that
the sixth amendment does not require a state to provide counsel
for an indigent defendant charged with a crime for which imprison-
ment upon conviction is authorized but not imposed; rather, the
Constitution requires only that no indigent should be sentenced to
a term of imprisonment unless the state has afforded him the right
to the assistance of appointed counsel. Thus, if the applicable stat-
ute provides for imprisonment, and it is likely that the defendant
will receive that penalty, counsel should be appointed; yet, this is
not the case in a majority of situations. 60
After addressing the major concerns dealing with the recogni-
tion of a right to counsel in DWI cases, it must be concluded that
the problems which such a right would foster have been overem-
phasized. Certainly such problems are not insurmountable and
should not be found to outweigh the importance of providing the
56. Id. at 447, 610 P.2d at 600.
57. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
58. Id. at 40-41.
59. 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
60. See generally Constitutional Law-Sixth Amendment-Indigent Criminal
Defendant's Right to Assigned Counsel-Misdemeanor-Scott v. Illinois, 18
DuQ. L. REV. 307 (1980).
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driver with an opportunity to consult with an attorney before mak-
ing the decision to submit to chemical testing.
Judy Moses '84

